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Abstract 
In this paper we question the validity of the arguments against Turkey’s membership 
of the EU and challenge the political wisdom of excluding Turkey from Europe. 
First, we argue that fundamental European values are not as uniform as they are 
made out to be. There are significant differences among the member states and the 
different European regions on basic values relating to religion and democracy. 
Second, we argue that many of Turkey’s supposed cultural differences with the rest 
of Europe are in fact unsubstantiated. We support our arguments by analyzing 
widely available macroeconomic evidence and the data from the European Values 
Study, 1999 (EVS99). 
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Admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide undeniable proof the 
Europe is not a closed ‘Christian Club’. It would confirm the Union’s nature as an 
inclusive and tolerant society, drawing strength from its diversity and bound together by 
common values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights 
…Turkish membership would further give evidence of the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy …(Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey [RICT] 2004: 16). 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The events following the publication of different caricatures of the prophet 
Mohammad, first in Denmark and later in a number of EU and non-EU countries, 
prove once again that conscious and conscientious efforts need to be made to heal a 
seemingly deep wound felt by many in the Islamic world. The wound, most pundits 
would agree, is the product of deeply felt cultural, socio-economic, and political 
differences between the industrialized democracies and the less industrialized countries 
that are home to the world’s vast majority of Muslims and a most precious resource: 
oil. According to Eric Rouleau, France’s ambassador to Turkey from 1988 to 1992, 
because Turkey borders the oil fields of the Middle East, the Turkic republics of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, and is linked through its Ottoman past to the Balkans, it has 
huge potential to play a stabilizing role in a turbulent region (Rouleau 2000: 101) – and 
ensure the steady flow of oil and gas to the industrialized countries of Europe and 
beyond. 
 
Based on the available macroeconomic and other evidence we wish to advance the 
argument that getting passed the near-stalemate in negotiations over Turkey’s 
membership of the EU needs to be more explicitly based on recognition of the key role 
played by formal and informal institutions in structuring the modes of governance in 
and between Islamic and non-Islamic nation states. This recognition does not imply 
acceptance or rejection of certain religion-related core values that for long have 
governed and given identity to each and every one of these nation states. We view such 
recognition as the first step toward seeking solutions that work through and build on, 
rather than dismiss, the institutions through which governance is exercised. Working 
through institutions entails embracing some institutions in both camps as legitimate 
while recognizing that others need to be counter-balanced in the short term through 
economic and other incentives and neutralized in the long term through development 
programmes and macroeconomic policy with a potential to pave the way for the 
formation of desirable institutions in a (still) emerging market economy such as 
Turkey’s. Our premise is that Turkey’s membership of the EU will boost Turkey’s 
capacity to strengthen its institutional ties with the EU through increased cooperation 
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in social and economic policy making. Such cooperation offers an important 
opportunity to start a process of understanding and healing to thwart a potentially 
serious cultural divide along religious lines with quite significant global implications. 
 
In this paper we focus on the relations between Turkey, an overwhelmingly Muslim 
nation state, and the European Union, an overwhelmingly Christian community of 
nations.2 We begin with an historical overview of the relations between Turkey and the 
European Union to highlight some of the pertinent facts that underlie our analysis. The 
arguments for and against Turkey’s membership into the EU are examined to illustrate 
the latest mood in the debate on the question and to separate some of the real concerns 
from rhetoric. The macroeconomics context is examined to highlight the degree of 
economic integration between Turkey and the EU, followed by two types of analysis. 
We carry out an institutional analysis by applying Parto’s (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) 
typology of institutions to the available data from secondary sources followed by an 
analysis of the primary data from the European Values Study, 1999 (EVS99). We show 
that the differences between Turkey and the EU are based more on (mis)perception 
rather than empirical evidence. 
 
We find extensive support for the argument that the social and cultural differences 
between Turkey and the EU are largely exaggerated and unsupported by empirical 
evidence.  Our analysis clearly shows that basic values related to religion and 
democracy, two cornerstones in many of the arguments against Turkey’s membership, 
differ greatly among the EU members and the wider European regions with this 
heterogeneity increasing in the EU25 as compared to EU15. A striking finding is that 
introducing Turkey to the analysis of the heterogeneity does not alter the main patterns 
of diversity. In most of the cases Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and 
maximum values for the EU25 as a whole: we find that Turkey’s scores on questions 
assessing religion/religious values and democracy as a political system fit well within 
the minimum and maximum values for the EU25. We conclude that the more 
significant differences between Turkey and the EU25 are of an economic and political 
nature and, as such, could only be addressed through increased integration of Turkey 
into Europe through formal and equitable membership, rather than pressures that 
could lead to Turkey’s isolation. Put differently, further work to bring Turkey into the 
EU’s fold can only be done through institutional capacity building with EU support in 
Turkey and within the EU based on full recognition of diversity and in pursuit of a 
multi-demoninational multi-culturalism. 
                                                 
2 Although EU25 states are all traditionally Christian, we use “overwhelmingly” here to acknowledge the 
small but growing non-Christian populations in the European Community as a whole. By the same token, 
although Turkey is officially secular, traditionally it is a country with an overwhelmingly Muslim population. 
Also, there is a significant difference between the laicism of Turkey and that of France as the role model: in 
France the state does not interfere with the affairs of the church whereas in Turkey the state “in practice, still 
exercises a strong control over religion” (WRR 2004: 52). 
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2. Historical and Institutional Context 
 
Turkey’s wish to join Europe goes back over fifty years in modern times (see Table 
1 for details) and has its roots in the sixteenth century when the Ottoman Empire 
under Suleyman the Magnificent was a major power to contend with. By the late 
nineteenth century the Empire had been reduced to a shadow of its former glory and 
earned the title “the sick man of Europe”. In 1923 Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) proclaimed 
the Turkish Republic as a secular nation state, one of whose first acts of modernization 
was to abolish the caliphate and replace it with legislative and other formal state 
institutions modeled after the French. The new state was formally committed to 
liberation of women, abolition of religious symbols, and a strong centralized state 
apparatus. After the Second World War the global power relations began to shift in 
favour of the United States as the strongest world power. Turkey willingly changed 
allegiances and became an ally of the United States in the fight to hold back Soviet 
influence and secure access to the rich oilfields of the Middle East. In 1949 Turkey 
joined the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a member. 
 
During the 1950s Turkey served as the main source of labour for Western Europe’s 
expanding economies, particularly Germany’s. There are now second and third 
generation Turks in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium who call these 
countries home while maintaining strong cultural ties to Turkey and being Turkish. For 
many Turks membership in the EU is a natural step along the trajectory of becoming 
more and more integrated into Europe, economically, politically, and culturally. This 
expectation seems to have been stymied by the events following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the break-up of the Eastern Bloc. Since the early 1990s, Western 
Europe seems to have shifted its focus away from Turkey as a prospective EU member 
to Eastern Bloc countries, some of which became EU members in 2005. 
 
Post-Soviet political change in Europe in the 1990s, the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Middle East and other regions culminating in the attack on the 
World Trade Center Towers on September 11, 2001, the subsequent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and increased anxiety about the large number of Muslims in 
Western Europe are some of the key factors that have redefined the parameters of the 
discourse on Turkey’s membership into the EU. Other issues include the banning of 
the Islamic headcover for women in French schools, the politically motivated murder 
of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by a Muslim extremist, and the anti-Danish and anti-
European demonstrations in Islamic countries following the printing of caricatures of 
the prophet Mohammad in Denmark and other European countries. There are those, 
like Valérie Giscard d’Estaing of France, Helmut Kohl of Germany, and Chancellor 
Wolfgang Schüssel of Austria who have openly opposed Turkey’s membership or 
called for a special status arrangement – the so-called “privileged partnership”– 
between the EU and Turkey. The opposition is based in part on the premise that the 
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Muslim immigrants have not integrated well into the European way of life and thus are 
a threat to social cohesion in smaller countries like Denmark and the Netherlands.3 
Another major issue is the prospect of a significant increase in the number of Muslims 
in formal European institutions if Turkey, with a population of 72 million, becomes a 
member of the EU.4 
 
Others reason that “a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-faith Europe could send 
a powerful message to the rest of the world that the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ is not the 
ineluctable destiny of mankind….Europe could play an inestimable role in future 
relations between the ‘West’ and the Islamic world” (RICT, 2004: 16). This view is 
shared by the Bush Administration in the United States and the Blair government in the 
United Kingdom, who have pointed out that excluding Turkey from Europe may 
aggravate the already uneasy relations with Islamic nation states including Turkey. 
According to Wallerstein (2004), barring Turkey from European Union membership 
increases the likelihood that the moderately Islamic and pro-Europe government of 
Turkey might give way to a less moderate regime and something that would rebound 
on Europe significantly. Indeed, despite the reservations expressed by some EU 
members, the official view of the EU is consistent with this line of reasoning:   
 
“If Turkish hopes [of EU membership] are disappointed, and advance of 
ultranationalist as well as Islamist currents should be expected and a revival of 
violence in the Kurdish populated regions would be likely leading to increased 
instability and the return of the military establishment to a more assertive role” 
(RICT, 2004: 22). 
 
The Turkish government has taken a series of measures to counter the arguments 
against its membership. One such measure is the publication in 2000 of the results 
from a survey conducted by TESEV, Turkey’s leading think-tank. A key finding of the 
survey is that the secular system of government in Turkey has the overwhelming 
support of the Turkish people. While the majority of those surveyed considered 
themselves as devout Muslims, they also believed that religion should not interfere with 
political life (RICT, 2004: 28). This conclusion is consistent with our findings, based on 
an analysis of the EVS99, reported later in this paper. Before turning to our analysis of 
the EVS99 data, however, we wish to summarize the arguments for and against 
Turkey’s membership of the EU and contextualize them in the widely available 
macroeconomic data to carry out a preliminary institutional analysis.   
                                                 
3 It is not a coincidence that of late these two countries have some of the most draconian anti-immigration laws in 
Europe. That many second and third generation immigrants still see themselves and are generally treated as “the 
other” is testament to the inadequacies in policies and programmes to institutionalize multi-culturalism in these 
countries.   
4 Another related concern is the projected financial burden imposed on the EU by the much poorer Turkey. 
However, in EU’s official assessment, these projections “have been based on current EU policies and the present 
performance of the Turkish economy, …[and] are…highly speculative” (RICT, 2004: 25-26). 
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2.1 The Case for Turkey’s Membership 
 
Turkey has come to be considered one of the world’s ten most promising emerging 
markets by the U.S. government (Rouleau, 2000: 101). The economic structure is 
market-based and liberalized, in line with the current trends in the overwhelming 
majority of the industrialized countries. Turkey’s political structure is compatible with 
the European parliamentary systems. In addition, there is a high degree of integration 
between the Turkish and EU economies. For example, around 50% of all imports into 
Turkey in the past ten years have come from EU countries. This figure stands at 60% 
with all European countries. Approximately 55% of Turkey’s exports are destined for 
EU countries and about 65% to European countries.5 There are numerous joint 
ventures, notably in the automotive sector. Fiat-Tofas founded in the 1970s is one of 
the largest automotive producers in Turkey. Other joint ventures include the Renault-
Oyak, Toyota-Sabanci, and Ford-Otosan operations.  
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5 For a detailed analysis of Turkey-EU economic relations with a special attention on customs union, see Togan 
(2000, 2004). All the figures in this section are calculated from original data available from Turkish Statistical 
Institute and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. Summary tables are available from the authors upon request.  
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More than 60 % of foreign owned companies operating in Turkey are European 
companies. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from European firms stands at roughly 
60% of the total FDI received while Turkish FDI is clearly directed towards EU and 
other European countries: 53% of total Turkish FDI in the last 25 years has been 
invested in EU countries while the figure for Europe as a whole stands at about 60%. 
In monetary terms the share of FDI in Turkey by EU countries has doubled from 1986 
to 2002, reaching 65% of all FDI Turkey received in the period 1986-2002. In 2004 
around 78% of total FDI inflows into Turkey originated from EU Member States.6 
Finally, and most importantly, Turkey is the only non-member state of the European 
Customs Union and recently has been described as a “functioning market economy” 
for the first time.7  
 
 
2.2  The Case against Turkey’s Membership 
 
Cultural differences are played up by both Europeans and Turks opposed to 
Turkey’s membership. Religious fundamentalists in Turkey promote the view that 
Turkish Islamic culture would decline under pressure from the non-Muslim Europe.8 
The ultra-Nationalists in Turkey play on the insecurity of Turks about their national 
identity and threats to its stability. Dissolution of a Turkish state is feared as a possible 
consequence of complying with the EU vision and rules about minority rights and the 
need for a more inclusive mode of governance that gives stronger voice to national 
ethnic and religious minorities, many of whom have historical misgivings about the 
Turkish Republic and its origins. Recently the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
changed its policy towards the EU and Turkey’s membership by arguing that neither 
Turkey nor the EU would benefit from Turkey’s membership.9 The ultra-left and the 
Communist Party of Turkey argue that the EU is nothing more than an instrument that 
rapidly integrates Turkey into world capitalism and the global market.10     
 
Khan (2005) argues that anti-Islamic sentiments in Europe strengthen anti-EU 
sentiments in Turkey which might play a significant role in undermining the accession 
talks: 
 
                                                 
6 European Commission (2005), p. 53. 
7 ibid, p. 54. 
8 For different views of Turkish public see the article by Adnan Khan in Maclean’s published on 17.10.2005 titled 
“Pride and Prejudice”.  
9 In a newspaper interview MHP’s leader Devlet Bahceli argues that Turkey should rethink EU membership as he 
views the negotiations as a “tactical distraction period” that would undermine Turkey’s current position. From 
Yeni Safak online accessed on 16.12.2005 http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/agustos/09/p05.html        
10 See for instance the webpage of Communist Party of Turkey accessed on 16.12.2005. 
http://www.tkp.org.tr/index.php?kat=585&yazi=725    
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“The more Turkey's culture is criticized by voices in Europe, the tighter Turks may 
pull the blanket of national and cultural identity around themselves. Ultimately, the 
real danger to Turkey's bid for EU membership may not lie in the difficult 
negotiations ahead in Luxembourg, but among those Turks who believe they will 
never really be accepted in the EU club – and who say good riddance.”11 
 
 
There is a strong sentiment among many Turkish intellectuals (and a large 
proportion of the public) that the EU-Turkey relations are not based on reciprocity and 
shared interests. The EU is said to be benefiting more than Turkey from these relations 
with no demonstrated willingness to help Turkey with some of its many worries about 
national security and economic stability.12 Emre Kongar, a well-known Turkish 
intellectual, states that the EU would stand to benefit the most from the accession talks 
since the talks are largely focused on what Turkey should do in terms of reforms to 
meet the EU’s approval without the EU making any commitments to help Turkey in 
seeing to its domestic priorities including potential ethnic strife, Cyprus, and the 
diplomatic chasms with Greece.13 There are several underlying and inter-related reasons 
for this view.  
 
Turkey’s application for full-membership in 1987 was rejected on the grounds that 
Turkey was not as yet a sufficiently developed economy. The EU recommended that 
Turkey should put efforts into increased economic integration with Europe, suggesting 
that Turkey enter a Customs Union agreement with the EU as a pre-requisite for being 
considered for membership. Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 
1995. However, by the time of the 1997 Luxembourg meeting the priorities of the EU 
had changed, resulting in the decision to turn down Turkey’s membership application 
because Turkey did not meet the Copenhagen Criteria, laid down by the European 
Council in Copenhagen in 1993. There were now political as well as economic 
conditions to be met by Turkey prior to being considered for membership. 
 
 
2.3 Discussion and Analysis 
 
The key points in the arguments for and against Turkey’s membership of the EU 
may be summarized as follows: 
 
                                                 
11 See Khan (2005).  
12 Even Ismail Cem, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, complains that EU has formed a deliberate 
habit of bringing specific issues (the Cyprus issue, problems with Greece, minorities issue etc.) into discussion 
over and over again, even if a consensus has been reached on them in previous negotiations. Cem, disappointedly, 
finds this “extremely unhealthy” as regards to the future negotiations between Turkey and the EU. For a 
thorough discussion see Cem (2005).  
13 The webpage is available at: http://www.kongar.org/aydinlanma/2004/448_AB_nin_Deli_Olmasi.php, 
accessed on 16.12.2005. 
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Arguments for: 
 
Arguments against: 
• Turkey is a geopolitical bridge between 
the west and the east bordering the major 
oil fields 
• Turkey is considered to be a large and 
dynamic emerging market with a 
liberalized market-based economy. 
• Turkey’s parliamentary system is 
compatible with the western European 
political systems 
• Turkey enjoys a high degree of economic 
integration with the EU (as indicated by 
its membership of the Customs Union, 
for example) 
• Turkey’s membership would validate the 
claim that the EU is an open and 
inclusive community of nations capable 
of drawing strength from cultural and 
religious diversity 
• Cultural and religious differences as well 
as political volatility and weak democracy 
represent insurmountable barriers to 
Turkey’s membership of the EU. (This 
sentiment is shared by both EU 
members and different anti-EU 
membership groupings in Turkey)   
• Increasingly, anti-EU membership 
proponents in Turkey argue that the EU 
is not sincere about accepting Turkey as 
a member  
• Turkey’s large and poor population 
would create direct (e.g., EU budget, 
structural funds) and indirect (e.g., flow 
of Turkish workers) financial burden to 
the other members. 
• Turkey’s large population would create a 
bias in favour of Turkey in EU decision 
making: Turkey would be the second 
most powerful state in terms of the 
number of votes 
 
 
Turkey is a young liberal democracy undergoing numerous growing pains: It is a 
formally secular nation state functioning in a geographically, demographically, and 
ethnically diverse country determined to industrialize and sustain economic growth. 
Since the late 1980s numerous measures have been implemented by the national 
government to increase and/or enhance the institutional capacity to support economic 
development. Intensive reform over the last few years has introduced various 
amendments in Turkish Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure (2004-2005), Law 
on Associations (2004), Law on Municipalities (2005), Law on Association of Local 
Governments (2005), Law of Enforcement of Sentences (2005), Tax Law (2005), The 
Public Financial Management and Financial Control Law (2003), Law of Topographies 
and Integrated Circuit (2005). All of these measures have been aimed at preparing the 
grounds for Turkey’s membership into the EU. 
 
For our analysis we highlight the following key points. First, with the signing of the 
Customs Union in 1995 Turkey’s economy became more progressively integrated into 
the European economy (e.g. Togan 2000 and 2004). Under the Customs Union 
agreement Turkey is expected to act in accordance with the common trade policy of the 
EU. But, as Manisali (2004) points out, because Turkey does not have membership 
privileges, complying with the agreement restricts Turkey’s policy space. Turkey is yet 
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to receive most of the $3.3 billions (US) promised by the EU to compensate for 
possible adverse effects of Customs Union on the Turkish economy.14  
 
Second, there are also allegations of unwritten criteria for Turkey’s membership. These 
include the demand by some member states that accession talks be “open-ended” and 
not necessarily result in full membership, that there should be “permanent” limitations 
on (Turkish) labour-mobility, insistence on the recognition of Cyprus, admission by 
Turkey to responsibility for the killing, displacement, and persecution of Armenians 
during the first world war, and a willingness to address the unresolved Kurdish 
question. Given this long list of debilitatingly complex issues, it is perhaps little wonder 
that many of the EU member states have no intention of embracing Turkey as a 
member. The key question here is not whether or not these issues should be used 
against Turkey’s membership but how the membership of the EU will accelerate and 
strengthen Turkey’s attempts to address the issues. 
 
Third, a public opinion survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies foundation in 2002 reveals that although around 65% of the respondents 
support EU membership, the question on sincerity of the EU regarding Turkey’s 
membership rated as 3.7 on a scale of 1 to 10.15 This disappointment is noted by 
Ahtisaari and Rohan of the Independent Commission on Turkey:  
 
“The same is true of the reported intention of some Governments to have the so 
called ‘Privileged Partnership’ concept explicitly included in the negotiating 
framework as alternative to full membership. This proposal has also been 
discussed at last December's [2001] European Council meeting and was rejected, 
resulting in a reference to "open-ended negotiations" in the Council's conclusions. 
Such wording, which has never been used in previous enlargement rounds, may 
have somewhat ruffled Turkey's feathers, but was finally accepted as constructive 
ambiguity so often used in international diplomacy”.16  
 
It is perhaps not very surprising that the public opinion in Turkey is 
increasingly turning against Europe17, harking back to the historical distrust in 
relations between Turkey and its European neighbours. Many of the Turkish 
opponents of membership draw parallels between the Turkey-Europe relations in 
the second half of the twentieth century and the relations between the Ottoman 
Empire and European powers in the 19th century, arguing that joining Europe 
                                                 
14 Manisali (2004) argues that Greece played a central role in forcing the EU to withhold the major portion of this 
amount. 
15 See Kirisci, K. (2002). 
16 ibid 
17 In a recent study Ulagay (2005) argues that there has been an increase in an anti-EU sentiments in Turkey and 
anti-integration sentiments in EU countries. Ulagay (2005) also points out that there is general disappointment 
with what the EU has delivered to date. This was manifested in the rejection of the European Constitution in the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands.  
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now could well result in the demise of the Turkish Republic just like closeness to 
Europe undermined the Empire in the nineteenth century (see Table 2 for an 
overview).18 The implied trajectory of this sentiment is undesirable for increased 
cohesion between Turkey, the Islamic world and the rest of Europe and should 
be avoided at all costs. 
 
Fourth, in Europe, opposition to Turkey’s membership is expressed in terms of 
Turkey having a weak and volatile democracy, a much larger population (72 millions) 
than many member states, and much lower standards of living. The question of 
democracy in Turkey notwithstanding, Turkey’s membership will impose a financial 
burden on the EU while the country assumes a strong voice in the decision making 
process due to its large population. In assessing the impact of Turkey’s membership on 
EU voting Baldwin and Widgren (2005) argue that under the Constitutional Treaty 
scheduled to come into effect on November 1, 2009 Turkey would be the second most 
powerful member state after Germany superseding other member states such as 
France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.19  There is also a general concern that on 
membership, Turkish workers would “flood” western European labour markets. It is 
worth pointing out that similar concerns were raised about Polish workers moving to 
Western Europe in search of better employment prospects after the Polish membership 
of the EU. While there was some movement in the short-term from Poland to Western 
European countries, this did not persist. It is also worth noting that since the last 
enlargement in 2004 a monthly average of 14,000 people have been immigrating to the 
United Kingdom from eastern EU countries. However, the British economy seems to 
have had the capacity to absorb them and there has been no sign of disruptions in the 
labour market as a result of these developments.20 
 
Fifth, a key argument against Turkey’s membership is its geographical location. It is 
argued that only 5% of Turkey’s total area lies in Europe and therefore Turkey cannot 
be counted as European. This is countered by the supporters for Turkey’s membership 
of the EU by the argument that the condition of being in Europe geographically is not 
applied to Cyprus, which is geographically located to the east of more than 50% of 
Turkey, or Malta, which is closer to Africa than Europe. The supporters point out that 
Cyprus is “European” because of its historical (economic and political) links with 
Europe and not because of geography. The same argument can be applied in support 
of Turkey’s membership. The geographic argument is particularly redundant when one 
views Europe as a “dynamic social construct” or “an imagined community that can 
change according to circumstance and political leadership” (WRR 2004:25). There are 
numerous political, economic, and social reasons for the construct to include Turkey.    
                                                 
18 For a thorough discussion see Kazgan (1999). 
19 See Baldwin and Widgren (2005).     
20 Internet source: http://www.ukimmigration.com/news/2006_03_01/uk/slowdown_in_jobseekers.htm. 
Accessed, 13.03.2006. 
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Finally, many of the opponents of Turkey’s membership point to the weaknesses of 
the Turkish legal system which, while modelled after the French and American systems, 
remains ineffective. As well, almost everyone agrees that corruption is rife in the 
country and there is a sizeable informal economy. The Turkish government’s efforts in 
recent years to reform its judicial system and set up functioning state institutions to 
effectively structure and regulate the economy have been lauded by the European 
Commission but deemed insufficient to warrant grounds for membership talks. But 
there is a limit to how much of the institution building can be “engineered” and 
imposed by the Turkish state in a top-down and isolated fashion. At any rate, there are 
numerous historical examples that suggest that top-down institution building runs the 
risk of never becoming fully embedded and is prone to reversal or implosion, as was 
the case with many state-enforced formal institutions in the former Soviet Union and 
the Eastern Bloc. Embeddedness of new institutional forms imposed from above 
requires external impetus and support from the ground up.  
 
2.3.1 Analyzing Turkey’s Institutions 
 
A preliminary analysis of the formal and informal institutions in Turkey shows that 
many pieces of the institutional puzzle for Turkey’s membership are in fact in place but 
require additional external impetus to become fully embedded. In our analysis we view 
institutions as structuring phenomena and manifest at different levels of inter-relation, 
scales of governance, and spheres of the political economy.21 Applying the levels-scales-
spheres perspective to institutions yields a loose but necessary typology of institutions 
(Figure 2).22 
 
Implicit in the arguments that Turkey is not yet ready for EU membership is the 
largely justified claim that Turkey has fewer and less effective formal institutions for 
democratic government than industrialized economies of Western Europe. Some of the 
key existing formal institutions such as the military, the National Security Council, and 
the Constitutional Court tend to serve an authoritarian state while others such as the 
various amendments to the judicial code remain ineffective or poorly implemented. A 
significant portion of socio-economic activity is governed through “clientalism” and 
patronage (Sozen and Shaw 2003). However, Turkey is not alone in this 
characterization. To illustrate, corruption is often cited as one of the key undesirable 
institutions that play a major role in Turkish society. No attempt has been made, as far 
as we have been able to determine, to compare corruption in Turkey with well-
documented corruption and organized crime in southern Italy. That Turkey should be 
singled out for having an abundance of informal institutions is arguably one-sided. 
 
                                                 
21 For an elaborate discussion of levels, scales, and systems see Parto (2005a). 
22 This typology and the subsequent discussion are based on Parto (2005b). 
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Figure 2. Characteristics and Manifestations of Institutions 
 Behavioural 
Institutions as 
standardized 
(recognizable) 
social habits – 
manifest in 
instinctive 
behaviour of 
individuals and 
groups as 
reflections of 
social norms 
Cognitive 
Institutions as 
mental models 
and constructs or 
definitions, based 
on values and 
embedded in 
culture – aspired 
to by individuals 
and groups  
Associative 
Institutions as 
mechanisms 
facilitating 
prescribed or 
privileged 
interaction among 
different private 
and public 
interests – 
manifest in 
activities of 
groups of 
individuals 
Regulative 
Institutions as 
prescriptions and 
proscriptions – 
manifest as the 
immediate 
boundaries of 
action by 
individuals and 
groups 
Constitutive 
Institutions 
setting the 
bounds of social 
relations – 
manifest as the 
ultimate 
boundaries of 
action by 
individuals and 
groups 
 
 
Informal; Social 
    
 
Formal; Societal
 
Adapted from Parto (2005b) 
 
The use of this typology of institutions in analysis elsewhere has illustrated that 
managing fundamental change will require government intervention as a main catalyst. 
However, such intervention succeeds only if it resonates with the pre-existing 
behavioural and cognitive institutions (Parto 2005c). In the context of the EU and in 
the case of Turkey, governing change as a role needs to be assumed jointly by the 
European Commission and the Turkish government. The former can provide structural 
support (including funds, expertise, and incentives) while the latter can ensure that any 
and all proposed changes are cognizant of the nature and importance of behavioural 
and cognitive institutions, i.e., knowing what “works” in the local environment and 
what is acceptable to the general populace. The impetus required for embedding 
associative, regulative, and constitutive institutions in Turkey needs to come from a 
higher level of government that includes the European Commission as a major player. 
Put differently, institutional change-making in Turkey requires policy making at a supra-
national scale of governance, i.e., the EU. It appears that the mode of governance at the 
EU scale is not (yet) conducive or committed to institutional change-making in Turkey 
as described along the above lines.  
 
However, it is important to recognize that commitment by the EU to accept and 
integrate Turkey as a full member will serve only as a first step, albeit an important one, 
in a long and challenging process of institutional change in Turkey. The Republic of 
Turkey continues to be governed by a strong-handed, centralized, and bureaucratic 
state apparatus inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Under this system of governance, 
the society belongs to, and is expected to, serve the state (Erdogan 1996, cited in Sozen 
and Shaw 2003:110). This mode of governance severely limits the emergence and 
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sustenance of independent civil society organizations and other institutional forms 
characteristic of democratic governments. Sozen and Shaw (2003) point to the 
autonomous military, the National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, and the 
civil service as the (regulative and constitutive) institutions (Figure 2) of the state to 
maintain the status quo through their dominant role in the policymaking structure. In 
Turkey “the views of the military normally dominate the decisions of the [National 
Security Council] whose recommendations … have always become national policies” 
(Yücel 2002, cited in Sozen and Shaw 2003:110). 
 
The insistence by the state apparatus that constitutive and regulative institutions of 
governance should serve the sovereignty and authority of the Turkish state above all 
else has had significant repercussions for the emergence and legitimization of civil 
society-based associative institutions. For example, trade unions and business 
associations are strongly discouraged from voicing opinions about public policy. The 
modus operandi for engaged participation in matters of policymaking seems to be 
through “a wide variety of clientelistic relationships” (Özbudun 1981, cited in Sozen 
and Shaw 2003:112), patronage, and sometimes corruption. Informal institutions such 
as patronage, kinship, and even corruption play important instrumental roles and 
represent part of the society’s fabric in authoritarian societies. Change in informal 
institutions is often slow and requires a time perspective that spans generations rather 
than elected governments. Policy aimed at further integration of Turkey into Europe 
needs to recognize the likely persistence of older, culturally embedded informal 
(behavioural and cognitive) Turkish institutions and devise innovative incentives and 
disincentives to catalyze the formation of new institutional forms that minimize or 
neutralize the role of older institutions. 
 
Tabellini (2005) uses “culture” as a catchall for culturally embedded behavioural and 
cognitive institutions. He attributes uneven economic performance in European 
regions to regional differences in behavioural and cognitive institutions. Where these 
institutions act as impediments to better economic performance, policy should provide 
for investments in education, cheap finance to facilitate the emergence of local 
entrepreneurs, and decentralization of administrative and political powers to stimulate 
the accumulation of social capital.  
 
More generally, institutions are created formally through actions of authority or 
emerge organically to bring order and predictability to interactions among individuals 
and organizations.23 In either case, institutions are reflections of learning by individuals 
and organizations and created to structure inter-relations (and thus determine the mode 
of governance) among individuals and organizations. Much of what remains to be done 
for Turkey in its attempts to develop institutional capacity for EU membership has to 
                                                 
23 See Parto (2005a) for a more elaborate discussion of institutions. 
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be prompted by the EU, not only as ideal type models to be adopted by Turkey (as was 
the case with the legal system, for example) but also through “interactive learning” and 
“learning by doing”, to paraphrase Bengt Lundvall and Richard Nelson. To continue on 
its path of learning from the EU member states, Turkey needs to interact with the EU 
Community socially, economically, and politically as an equal partner in need of direct 
assistance from the other members. Further industrialization of Turkey will need to be 
supported by a political economy integrated with Europe’s most advanced economies 
and with the political, economic, and social institutions to match. EU membership for 
Turkey is likely to provide a much-needed impetus for the emergence of an institutional 
landscape more compatible with Europe’s liberal democracies and capable of 
facilitating further economic expansion of Turkey and its integration with the EU.  
 
From a policy perspective, and before offering a “to-do” list of specific policy 
measures, we need to ask the question: “How really different is Turkey compared with 
the rest of the EU?” The next section uses available empirical data to answer this 
question.  
 
 
3. Analysis of the European Values Study Data   
 
Our starting point is that European “common values” are not as common as they 
are believed to be. We will also note that Turkey fits reasonably well within this range 
of “uncommonality”. We support this claim by presenting empirical evidence from the 
European Values Study 1999 (EVS99). In our analysis we have focused on fundamental 
values such as individual’s views on religion, democracy, and politics since these values 
seem to feature strongly in statements against Turkey’s membership. We then turn our 
attention to traditional values and culture, since these are the most important concerns 
expressed within Turkey in opposition to Turkey’s membership of the EU. We show 
that there are fewer actual differences between Turkey and the EU countries, evidence 
that perhaps the foundations for these arguments are less than empirically sound and 
perhaps motivated by other concerns. 
 
EVS99 was designed to measure change and persistence in people’s social and 
demographic characteristics, fundamental value orientations, attitudes, and norms in 
ordinary life. The study was designed to provide detailed data on social structure and 
occupation, family, religious affiliation, politics, and various measures of social capital. 
One common problem in such datasets is that the sample size for each country may 
not reflect the true population of the country. Since our intention is to compare 
countries we adjusted the original data using population weight as a remedy to 
complications that may arise from over-sampling. This adjustment ensures that each 
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country is represented in proportion to its population size. We formed seven country 
groups24:  
 EU15: 15 EU member countries prior to the latest enlargement. 
 EU25: All current EU member states excluding Cyprus. 
 EU10: 9 member states joined EU in 2004, excluding Cyprus. 
 EUNORTH: Four northern member states included in the EU15; Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands and Sweden. 
 EUSOUTH: Four southern member states included in the EU15; Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain.   
 EUAPP3: Three candidate countries; Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. 
 FORMER_SOV: Three former soviet countries; Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.  
The analysis simply consists of calculating the average score for each group and then 
comparing the scores of Turkey with the average score for each of the seven-country 
group to see whether Turkey stands out from the rest. To highlight the heterogeneity 
within EU15 and EU25, we make use of the range, i.e., the minimum and the 
maximum score of each question, and present in brackets the code for the country 
corresponding to these maximum and minimum scores. We have not performed any 
statistical tests assessing the statistical significance of the difference since these tests 
scores reflect the magnitude of the difference but not the direction. In other words, the 
test scores indicate whether Turkey’s scores are significantly different from EUAPP3 
for instance, but not whether Turkey performs better or worse than EUAPP3. Instead, 
we have indicated four alternative classifications for every table [see Tables 3-4, for 
details]: 
 
i. Variables for which Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH or 
EU10 
ii. Variables for which Turkey performs better than at least one of the three 
groups; EUAPP3, EU10 and EUSOUTH 
iii. Variables for which Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the 
maximum of EU25 and do not belong to the first two groups 
iv. Variables for which Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25  
 
 
4.  Findings 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 summarize our main findings. A key finding is that for almost all 
the variables relating to religion, Turkey falls within the range of values representing the 
importance of religion among the EU25. However, for a better understanding we need 
                                                 
24 Country scores are available in request. EVS99 does not provide data on Cyprus.   
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to compare the variables (v6, v101 and v115) which relate to questions on believing in 
god and on whether the respondents belonged to a religious denomination. As 
expected the proportion of respondents who believe in god or who at least belong to a 
religion is higher in Turkey when compared to the average of EU15 or EU25 (Table 3 
and Figures 3 and 4). What is striking is that Turkey’s scores are close to the EU 
average when respondents are asked how religious they are or how often they attend 
religious services (see for instance variables v110 and v105, Table 3, Figures 3 and 4). 
This indicates that Turkey’s population is not as religious as commonly perceived or, to 
put it in another way, is only as religious as other EU countries. 
 
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
v101
v107
v108
v109
v111
v112
v113
v114
v115
v172
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r
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
How Far is Turkey from the EU25: Religion
Figure 3
 
 
We also examined the role of religion in education (v106 and v172, Table 3 and 
Figure 3 and 4). In European countries attendance in religious services is higher in 
childhood than in adulthood. However, Turkey’s scores do not display such a structure. 
When the responses to the two questions are combined it is hard to assert that the 
children in Turkey are exposed to more religious education (either from the family or 
the from education system), than their European counterparts. This finding is also 
supported by an optional question in the EVS99.25 Respondents were asked whether 
                                                 
25 This question is not included in our general analysis since the responses were collected only from 7 countries. 
The question (o13) asks “How much do you agree or disagree with the following?: In my opinion, some time 
should be set aside for prayer, meditation and contemplation in all schools”. We have reversed the answer 
categories so that (1)   represents “I strongly disagree” and (5) represents “I strongly agree”. The averages for 
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they supported the argument that time should be set aside for prayers and meditation in 
all schools. The findings show that the respondents from Italy and Austria support this 
argument more strongly than the respondents in Turkey. With respect to parental views 
on religion in education, we find that Turkey is not that different from the rest of the 
EU. 
 
Turkish respondents’ position regarding the three questions assessing the effect of 
religion on public office and government decision making is in line with the above 
findings (see Table 3 and Figure 4 variables v130, v131 and v132). This is further 
supported by an optional question that asks the respondents to assess the involvement 
of church/mosque in national politics on a 1 to 4 scale.26 With respect to religion and 
government, our result show that Turkey does not stand out when compared to other 
European countries.  
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seven countries are; Italy, 3.78; Austria, 3.64; Turkey, 3.54; Bulgaria, 3.06; Lithuania, 3.05; Germany 2.94 and 
Czech Republic, 2.62. 
26 The optional question 15 asks; “Do you think that the church/mosque has an influence on national politics or 
not? We have reversed the answer categories so that (1) represents “no, absolutely not” and (4) represents “yes, 
absolutely”. The averages for seven countries are; Luxemburg, 2.98; Germany 2.89; Croatia, 2.79; Turkey, 2.79; 
Finland, 2.71; Austria,2.68; Lithuania, 2.66; Czech Republic, 2.58 and Romania, 2.52, 
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Turkey’s scores on the indicators regarding individuals’ responses about the 
democratic political system is promising when compared to other EU countries (see 
questions v220 – v223, Table 4 and Figure 5). For all of the four cases Turkey’s 
position is at least better than the four southern EU member states and the three 
applicant countries. This finding is a clear indication of how, in relative terms, 
democracy is ingrained in Turkish political system despite the young age of the 
republic. 
 
It seems that the idea of a political system with a strong government and where the 
army is a major ruling factor receives more support in Turkey than its European 
counterparts (see questions v216 and v218, Table 4 and Figure 5). While significant, 
this finding needs to be contextualized: The army is viewed by many in Turkey as a 
major force to ensure the sustenance of a modern, secular (though authoritarian) nation 
state. It is only recently that the Turkish political system has been able to function 
without explicit reference to or intervention from the army. There continues to exist 
strong popular support for the army as a major stabilizing force in Turkey’s system of 
governance despite human rights concerns as a major issue for Turkey due to the 
army’s periodic use of excessive force and political suppression to bring about order 
and maintain the state apparatus. In this case our findings show that Turkey’s score falls 
significantly out of the range of values for EU25 (see question v224, Table 4 and Figure 
5).                                   
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The mostly legitimate criticisms of Turkey’s weak democracy notwithstanding, it 
appears that the objection by some EU member countries to Turkey’s membership is 
based on a misperceived belief that Turkey’s mix of ethnicity and culture (including 
religion) is incompatible with that of Europe in general.27 This misperception is 
systemic and shared by even those who hold a conciliatory view on Turkey’s 
membership. For example, a recent speech by Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of 
the European Commission, on the issue of the cartoons of the prophet Mohammad 
makes reference to Europe’s “common values and traditions” such as respect for 
personal life and freedom, freedom of speech and a clear distinction between politics 
and religion.28 However, as Table 3 clearly shows there are significant differences in the 
common values and traditions of the EU member states, including the relation between 
politics and religion (v129-v132). 
 
To sum up, there is significant heterogeneity of views on basic values in EU15 and 
EU25, particularly when we compare northern and southern European countries. 
Rather than disappoint, this finding should be the beacon call for the EU policy makers 
to recognize the differences and look for common grounds based on a vast reservoir of 
strengths. The success of the European project significantly depends on the 
performance of the EU in bonding, bridging and managing this heterogeneity. It is 
clear that a well-designed institutional system is a prerequisite for success in this regard.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Having established that many of Turkey’s supposed differences with EU15 and 
EU25 are exaggerated and unsupported by empirical data, we are led to conclude that 
Turkey should not be held hostage for its poor record of addressing ethnic and 
structural questions in membership discussions. Further, Turkey is less likely to 
effectively address the outstanding membership requirement issues in isolation from 
the EU. In our analysis we have made the point that it would be at best difficult for 
Turkey to overcome barriers to membership and integration into the EU without the 
support from the EU. If the question is simply “why should the EU help Turkey 
overcome its challenges?”, we have argued that there are numerous political benefits for 
Europe and the global community to justify direct and overt assistance by the EU to 
integrate Turkey into Europe through full membership. 
 
However, the formal acceptance of Turkey into the EU and the commitment to 
assist Turkey to overcome its many issues are only the start of a long process of 
structural and institutional change likely to span generations. The slowness in the 
                                                 
27 See, for example, McLaren (2000), Lino (2004), and Wood and Quaisser (2005). 
28 Jose Manuel Barroso, “Statement on the issue of the cartoons of prophet Muhammed” European Parliament, 
Strasbourg, 15 February 2006, SPEECH/06/86.  
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process of change is largely attributable to Turkey’s institutional landscape. Turkish 
institutions, like institutions in other countries, are manifestations of historical 
circumstances, learning, and evolution. One policy implication of our argument is that 
the EU should recognize the many similarities between Turkey and EU25, as indicated 
in our analysis of EVS99 data, and assist Turkey to overcome its institutional capacity 
deficiencies for membership through cooperation. In addition to various forms of 
incentives provided by the EU, conscious efforts need to be made to collect valuable 
empirical data through frequent follow-ups to surveys like EVS99. For example, a 
Turkish Social Survey modelled after the German and American Social Surveys can 
provide valuable information on social issues and values that could be used in 
conjunction with basic census statistics. For Turkey, this survey should provide regional 
information drawn from adequately sized samples. 
 
Collection and analysis of quantitative survey data will need to be complemented 
with qualitative narratives to generate the contextual richness often missing from 
quantified data and analysis. For example, to establish, as accurately as possible, the 
largely informal behavioural and cognitive institutions (Figure 2) requires adopting 
research methodology consistent with Neale’s (1987) method for identifying 
institutions (Box 1). 
 
Box 1. Identifying Institutions 
Components of institutions are manifest as activities of people in situations and in 
contexts. Observation and characterization of these components allow operational 
recognition, not definition, of institutions. There are three characteristics that allow 
institution identification: “First, there are a number of people doing. Second, there are rules 
giving the activities repetition, stability, predictable order. Third, there are folkviews – 
most certainly what Walton Hamilton meant by a ‘bundle of intellectual usages’ – 
explaining or justifying the activities and the rules” (Neale 1987:1182). “Doing” can be 
seen and thus identified; “rules” can be identified by “ordering the doings into repetitive 
event sequences”; and the “folkviews justify the activities or explain why they are going 
on, how they are related, what is important and what is unimportant in the patterns of 
regularity. Folkviews can be discovered by observation, but here the eye is a minor 
instrument and the ear is a major one” (Neale 1987:1183). 
Source: Parto (2005a) 
 
Conducting research along the above lines can be supported through funding 
programmes focused on social cohesion. In operational terms this points to policy 
measures that target increases in human and social capital in the larger EU Community 
and beyond, to include borderline cases like Turkey which could well serve as 
beachheads toward the insitutionalization of mutual respect for deeply held (and often 
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religion-based) social and cultural values. The question is not which set of cultural 
values is “better” but to identify them and find ways to engage parties of fundamentally 
different creed and religion in equitable discourse about the future. 
 
Two recent studies have shown that historical political institutions and the 
educational system have played significant roles in shaping the current state of 
European regions (Tabellini 2005; Akcomak and ter Weel 2006). Tabellini (2005) 
reports that culture, defined as current values and norms, is a key determinant of 
economic growth. Using a similar methodology, Akcomak and ter Weel (2006), not 
only support these findings but also underline the importance of social capital in 
explaining differences in innovation performance, which in turn contributes to 
differences in regional development. An immediate implication of these findings is that 
EU policies on provision of structural funds and framework programs should be 
complemented with specific programs to enhance institutional capacity and human 
capital. In the long run, such policies will nurture the formation of formal institutions 
in such arenas as education which in turn encourages the emergence of informal 
institutions manifested as changed values, increased trust, and increased social capital.         
 
That Turkey does not have a stellar record in modern times on dealings with its 
ethnic questions, while not condonable, is not surprising given the young age of the 
Republic. It took hundreds of years and much strife before most of the industrialized 
nations of Europe managed to define themselves as cohesive nation states. Rather than 
holding Turkey hostage for its poor record of addressing its ethnic questions, the EU 
could cease the opportunity represented by the accession negotiations to promote and 
institutionalize economic progress, equity, and democracy in the Turkish political 
economy to create the economic and political foundations of a liberal democracy. By 
embracing Turkey as a member state the EU can help the young Republic in efforts to 
build the formal institutions that will serve as the pillars of liberal democracy in Turkey. 
Carefully designed and culturally sensitive formal institutions that reconcile the cultural 
and political differences between Turkey and industrially advanced European countries 
can, in time, nurture the emergence of deeply rooted political democracy, trust, and a 
flourishing civil society. Turkey has made a series of first steps in reforming existing 
institutions and establishing new ones. To bear fruit these institutions need to be seen 
as an extension of the liberal democratic traditions that define most of the EU25 
member states, and as such supported by further engagement of Turkey in EU affairs 
through full membership as soon as possible. A positive and timely response to 
Turkey’s wish to join the EU would pre-empt the likely popular backlash against 
joining the EU on the account of being rejected by the rest of the Community despite 
demonstrated goodwill on Turkey’s part. 
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Table 1: Milestones of Turkey – EU relations 
July 31, 1959 Application to European Economic Community (EEC) 
September 12, 1963  Ankara Agreement creating an association with the EEC. The 
agreement was signed with the main intention that Turkey to 
become a member after completion of three phases of 
negotiations: a five-year preparation period, a two-phase 
transition period (customs union to be completed at the end of 
this two-phase) and a final period. 
 
October 13, 1970 Additional protocol that determined the responsibilities of 
both parties, was signed (came into effect in 1973). However 
due to political distress and the military takeover in 1980 these 
responsibilities were never met. 
 
July 14, 1987 Application for full-membership. This was rejected on 
economic basis that Turkey was not a fully-developed 
economy. Instead formation of a customs union was 
recommended as a first step. 
1993 Customs union negotiations started. 
March 6, 1995 Customs union agreement that took affect on 01.01.1996 
December 1997 Contrary to the expectations, Turkey was not granted a 
candidate country status in the Luxembourg summit at the end 
of 1997.  
December 1999 Turkey was finally given candidate country status in the Helsinki 
Summit. The EU Council decision clearly states that “…The 
Council welcomes the recent positive developments in Turkey 
and Turkey’s willingness to continue its reforms in order to 
meet the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate country on the 
road to joining the Union based on the same criteria applied to the other 
candidate countries…” 
 
July 24, 2003 Turkey’s national program for the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire was revised and published in the Official Gazette. 
December 17, 2004 The European Council decided to open accession talks with 
Turkey as of 03.10.2005 
Source: Adopted from the webpage of the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey. Accessed  26.12.2005, 
http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/  
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Table 2: Turkish-European relations from Ottoman Empire to Republic of Turkey 
 Ottoman Empire vs Europe, 19
th 
century   
Turkey vs European Union, 20th 
century 
Economic 
demands 
Starts with extending capitulations in 
the 18th century and ends with 
Baltalimani trade agreement with the 
United Kingdom (1838) which grants 
certain privileges to UK traders. 
These privileges were extended to 
other countries such as France (1838), 
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Norway 
and Sweden (1840), Denmark (1841), 
Portugal (1843) and Russia (1846). 
Consequently, the status of the 
foreign traders became even better 
than the local (Turkish) traders. Local 
traders and producers were unable to 
compete with foreign traders that 
later caused the financial and 
economic bankruptcy of the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of the 19th century. 
Starts with the agreement of Ankara 
(1963). First phase was the 
liberalization attempts of the capital 
markets and finalized in 1989 by full 
capital mobility. Economic integration 
accelerated after 1989 when the full-
membership application of Turkey 
was rejected on the basis of Turkey’s 
economic underdevelopment. 
Economic integration ends with 
customs union (6 March 1995). As a 
result, Turkey is entitled to act in 
accordance with the common trade 
policy of the EU, unfortunately is not 
able to shape this policy since Turkey 
is not a member state. This fact 
means that the trade and economic 
integration is based on a one-way 
relation rather than reciprocity 
(Manisalı, 2004).  
 
Political 
demands  
Most of the political demands by the 
Europeans regarding the so-called 
human rights, but specifically rights 
of minorities (and more specifically 
the rights of the Christian minorities, 
not others) and foreigners (foreigners 
living in Ottoman territory especially 
foreign traders) was granted with the 
modernizations attempts “Tanzimat” 
(1839) and “Islahat” (1856) . 
After the one-way economic 
integration finalized, Turkey was not 
granted a candidate status because of 
political reasons (1989). Most of the 
political demands (human rights, the 
issue of Cyprus etc.) were granted by 
amendments in constitution, civil law 
and a variety of other adjustments 
within a period of ten years (especially 
in the last  two years). This resulted in 
meeting the terms of the Copenhagen 
criteria.  
  
Recognition 
as a 
European 
state 
Ottoman Empire is recognized as a 
part of the “European Concert”. Paris 
Peace Agreement (1856) 
Turkey is recognized as a candidate 
country (The period from December 
1999 to 17 December 2004). 
Other 
demands 
A mixture of political and economic 
demands. For instance land reform 
(1858) changed the land ownership 
structure which enables foreign 
ownership of Ottoman lands.     
A mixture of political and economic 
demands. For instance the legal 
adjustments that would enable foreign 
ownership of immovable are 
completed at the beginning of 2006.    
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Table 3: Fundamental Values I: Religion, Politics and Education       
 v6 v101 v115 v110 v105 v111 v112 v113 v114 
  
How 
important in 
your life: 
religion 
Do you 
belong to a 
religious 
denomination 
Do you 
believe in 
God? 
Are you a 
religious 
person 
How often 
attend religious 
services 
Church/ 
Mosque 
answers to: 
moral 
problems 
Church/ 
Mosque 
answers to: 
family life 
Church/ 
Mosque 
answers to: 
spiritual 
needs 
Church/ 
Mosque 
answers to: 
social 
problems 
EU15 2.46 0.77 0.78 2.37 3.85 0.40 0.33 0.59 0.29 
EU25 2.46 0.73 0.76 2.38 3.92 0.45 0.39 0.65 0.30 
EU10 2.46 0.64 0.73 2.41 4.06 0.55 0.51 0.77 0.31 
EUNORTH 2.23 0.75 0.66 2.26 2.92 0.31 0.26 0.56 0.24 
EUSOUTH 2.80 0.86 0.92 2.62 4.79 0.52 0.41 0.67 0.36 
EUAPP3 2.91 0.86 0.86 2.52 4.71 0.63 0.57 0.78 0.37 
TURKEY 3.73 0.98 0.98 2.61 4.53 0.76 0.67 0.83 0.44 
FORMER_SOV 2.43 0.53 0.76 2.26 3.06 0.70 0.53 0.76 0.26 
          
Min [EU15] 2.04 [DE] 0.45 [NL] 0.53 [SE] 1.84 [SE] 2.38 [FR] 0.20 [DK] 0.15 [DK] 0.46 [LU] 0.11 [DK] 
Max [EU15] 3.01 [IE] 0.96 [GR] 0.96 [PT] 2.78 [PT] 5.92 [IE] 0.62 [IT] 0.48 [IT] 0.72 [PT] 0.43 [IT] 
Min [EU25] 1.82 [MT] 0.25 [EE] 0.40 [CZ] 1.84 [SE] 2.38 [FR] 0.20 [DK] 0.15 [DK] 0.46 [LU] 0.11 [DK] 
Max [EU25] 3.56 [CZ] 0.99 [MT] 0.99 [MT] 2.90 [PL] 6.73 [MT] 0.82 [LT] 0.80 [LT] 0.86 [SI] 0.58 [LT] 
                    
1: Not at all 0: No 0: No 
1: Convinced 
atheist 
1: Never / 
never practice 0: No 0: No 0: No 0: No 
Variable coding 
4: Very 
important 1: Yes 1: Yes 3: Religious 
8: More than 
once a week 1: Yes 1: Yes 1: Yes 1: Yes 
Note: See Table 10 for mean number of observations for each country (country group) and the codes for countries.   
 
Legend 
Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH (and/or EU10) 
Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups, EUAPP3, EUSOUTH and EU10 
Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 (and do not belong to the first two groups in the legend) 
Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25 
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Table 3: Fundamental Values I: Religion, Politics and Education (continued)   
 v107 v108 v109 v106 v129 v130 v131 v132 v172 
  
Religious 
service 
important: 
birth 
Religious 
service 
important: 
marriage 
Religious service 
important: death 
How often 
attend 
religious 
services 12 
years old 
Politicians 
and God 
Religious 
leaders and 
influence on 
voting 
Religion and 
public office 
Religious 
leaders and 
influence 
government 
decisions 
Learn 
children at 
home: 
religious faith 
EU15 0.71 0.73 0.80 5.65 2.09 4.04 2.42 3.90 0.20 
EU25 0.72 0.73 0.80 5.41 2.20 4.05 2.54 3.91 0.21 
EU10 0.74 0.74 0.80 4.94 2.41 4.08 2.78 3.93 0.23 
EUNORTH 0.62 0.63 0.76 3.99 1.77 3.88 2.09 3.72 0.09 
EUSOUTH 0.82 0.83 0.87 6.31 2.49 3.99 2.73 3.83 0.29 
EUAPP3 0.90 0.93 0.94 5.11 2.96 4.11 3.33 4.04 0.52 
TURKEY 0.42 0.82 0.95 4.44 3.52 3.88 3.42 3.76 0.54 
FORMER_SOV 0.80 0.60 0.83 2.18 2.70 4.02 3.31 3.78 0.12 
          
Min [EU15] 0.40 [NL] 0.45 [NL] 0.55 [NL] 3.29 [DK] 1.53 [DK] 3.69 [NL] 1.66 [DK] 3.41 [SE] 0.05 [SE] 
Max [EU15] 0.92 [IE] 0.93 [IE] 0.96 [IE] 7.13 [IE] 3.07 [GR] 4.42 [FR] 3.04 [GR] 4.34 [DK] 0.40 [IE] 
Min [EU25] 0.40 [NL] 0.41 [CZ] 0.50 [CZ] 2.51 [EE] 1.53 [DK] 3.69 [NL] 1.66 [DK] 3.41 [SE] 0.05 [SE] 
Max [EU25] 0.96 [MT/PL] 0.96 [MT] 0.97 [MT/PL] 7.64 [MT] 3.07 [GR] 4.42 [FR] 3.58 [MT] 4.34 [DK] 0.57 [MT] 
                    
0: No 0: No 0: No 
1: Never, 
practice never 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
0: Not 
mentioned 
Variable coding 
1: Yes 1: Yes 1: Yes 
8: More than 
once a week 
5: Agree 
strongly 
5: Agree 
strongly 
5: Agree 
strongly 
5: Agree 
strongly 1: Mentioned 
Note: See Table 5 for mean number of observations for each country (country group) and the codes for countries.   
 
Legend 
Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH (and/or EU10) 
Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups, EUAPP3, EUSOUTH and EU10 
Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 (and do not belong to the first two groups in the legend) 
Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25 
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Table 4: Fundamental Values II: Political System and Democracy           
 v213 v216 v217 v218 v219 v220 v221 v222 v223 v224 
  
Are you 
satisfied 
how the 
democracy 
works 
Political 
system: 
strong 
leader 
Political 
system: 
experts 
making 
decisions 
Political 
system: the 
army ruling
Political 
system: 
democratic 
Democracy: 
best political 
system 
Democracy: 
causes bad 
economy 
Democracy: 
is indecisive 
Democracy: 
cannot 
maintain 
order 
How much 
respect for 
human rights 
these days 
EU15 2.58 1.81 2.36 1.29 3.48 3.45 2.11 2.47 2.10 2.87 
EU25 2.48 1.86 2.51 1.32 3.39 3.36 2.20 2.52 2.21 2.75 
EU10 2.28 1.95 2.80 1.37 3.21 3.19 2.37 2.63 2.43 2.53 
EUNORTH 2.67 1.82 2.29 1.27 3.54 3.46 1.97 2.42 2.02 3.14 
EUSOUTH 2.50 1.72 2.26 1.41 3.54 3.41 2.32 2.52 2.15 2.71 
EUAPP3 1.99 2.31 3.16 1.68 3.35 3.22 2.39 2.51 2.26 2.26 
TURKEY 1.76 2.85 2.95 1.92 3.40 3.27 2.22 2.57 2.21 1.69 
FORMER_SOV 1.73 2.51 2.60 1.84 2.85 2.89 2.48 2.74 2.64 1.91 
           
Min [EU15] 2.26 [IT] 1.36 [GR] 1.56 [GR] 1.09 [DK] 3.27 [FI] 3.08 [UK] 1.83 [DE] 2.16 [DE] 1.74 [AT] 2.60 [FR] 
Max [EU15] 2.93 [LU] 2.28 [LU] 2.64 [AT] 1.65 [PT] 3.80 [GR] 3.70 [DK] 2.48 [FR] 2.92 [FR] 2.60 [FR] 3.33 [DK] 
Min [EU25] 2.00 [SK] 1.36 [GR] 1.56 [GR] 1.09 [DK] 3.01 [EE] 3.07 [HU] 1.83 [DE] 2.10 [MT] 1.74 [AT] 1.91 [LT] 
Max [EU25] 2.93 [LU] 2.62 [LV] 3.21 [AT] 1.78 [PL] 3.80 [GR] 3.70 [DK] 2.50 [SK] 3.00 [PL] 2.86 [PL] 3.33 [DK] 
                      
1: Not at all 
satisfied 1: Very bad 1: Very bad
1: Very 
bad 1: Very bad 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: Disagree 
strongly 
1: No respect 
at all Variable coding 
4: Very   
satisfied 
4: Very 
good 
4: Very 
good 
4: Very 
good 
4: Very 
good 
4: Agree 
strongly 
4: Agree 
strongly 
4: Agree 
strongly 
4: Agree 
strongly 
4: Lot of 
respect 
Note: See Table 5 for mean number of observations for each country (country group) and the codes for countries.   
 
Legend 
Turkey performs better than EUAPP3 and EUSOUTH (and/or EU10) 
Turkey performs better than at least one of the three groups, EUAPP3, EUSOUTH and EU10 
Turkey’s scores oscillate between the minimum and the maximum of EU25 (and do not belong to the first two groups in the legend) 
Turkey’s scores are outside the range of EU25 
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Table 5: Mean number of observations and country codes 
FRANCE          FR 1,599.00 
UK              UK  972.91 
GERMANY         DE 1,879.44 
AUSTRIA         AT 1,469.14 
ITALY           IT 2,000.00 
SPAIN           ES 1,200.00 
PORTUGAL        PT 926.79 
NETHERLANDS     NL 987.87 
BELGIUM         BE 1,851.42 
DENMARK         DK 1,023.00 
SWEDEN          SE 1,007.99 
FINLAND         FI 1,029.50 
GREECE          GR 1,142.00 
LUXEMBOURG      LU 1,184.45 
IRELAND         IE 985.24 
ESTONIA         EE 1,003.33 
LATVIA          LV  1,013.00 
LITHUANIA        LT 952.90 
POLAND          PL 1,064.07 
CEZC            CZ 1,865.75 
SLOVAKIA        SK 1,327.82 
HUNGARY         HU 968.21 
MALTA           MT 998.52 
SLOVENIA        SI 1,006.00 
ROMANIA         RO 1,146.00 
BULGARIA        BG 978.68 
CROATIA         HR 915.31 
TURKEY          TR 1,206.00 
RUSSIA  - 2,490.05 
UKRAINE         - 1,193.31 
BELARUS         - 1,000.00 
EU15            EU15            20,233.03 
EU25            EU25            30,432.62 
EU10            EU10            10,199.59 
EUNORTH         EUNORTH         4,048.35 
EUSOUTH         EUSOUTH         5,268.79 
EUAPP3          EUAPP4 3,039.99 
FORMER_SOV FORMER_SOV 4,683.36 
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APPENDIX  
 
The actual questions, the variable numbers and the original coding of the variables from the EVS 1999 are 
presented below, as it is in the European Values Study (1999) Methodological Questionnaire. We have coded the yes-
no questions as [1: yes, 0: no]. In most of the cases we have reversed the coding. Such cases are denoted with 
an asterisk.  
 
 
V6*   Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life: Religion  
  [1: very important, 4: not at all important] 
 
V101  Do you belong to a religious denomination?  
  [1: yes, 2: no] 
 
V105* Apart from weddings, funerals and christening, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days? 
  [1: more than once a week, 8: never, practically never] 
 
V106* Apart from weddings, funerals and christening, about how often did you attend religious 
services when you were 12 years old? 
  [1: more than once a week, 8: never, practically never] 
 
Do you personally think it is important to hold a religious service for any of the following 
events;   [1: yes, 2: no] 
V107   Birth 
V108   Marriage 
V109   Death 
 
V110*  Independently of whether you go to the church or not, would you say you are;   
  [1: a religious person, 2: not a religious person, 3: a convinced atheist] 
 
Generally speaking do you think that your church is/the churches are giving, in your country, 
adequate answer to; [1: yes, 2: no] 
V111  The moral problems and needs of the individual  
V112  The problems of family life 
V113  People’s spiritual needs 
V114  The social problems facing our country today 
   
  Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? [1: yes, 2: no] 
V115  God  
 
  How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following. 
[1: agree strongly, 5: disagree strongly] 
V129*  Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office 
V130*  Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections 
V131* It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office  
V132*  Religious leaders should not influence government decisions  
 
Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, 
do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five. 
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  [1: important, 0: not mentioned] 
V172  Religious faith 
 
V213* On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied not very satisfied with the way 
democracy is developing in your country? 
  [1: very satisfied, 4: not at all satisfied]  
 
I am going to describe various types of political system and ask what you think about each as 
a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is very good, fairly good, 
fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? 
  [1: very good, 4: very bad] 
V216*  Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament 
V217* Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the 
country 
V218*  Having the army rule the country 
V219*  Having a democratic political system 
 
I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political 
system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, 
after I read each of them? 
[1: agree strongly, 4: disagree strongly] 
V220*  Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government 
V221*  In democracy, the economic systems runs bad 
V222*  Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling 
V223*  Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order 
 
V224* How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in your country?) Do you 
feel there is;  
[1: A lot of respect for individual human rights, 4: not respect at all]  
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